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Abstract
We examine robustness of stability under learning to observability of exogenous
shocks. Regardless of observability assumptions, the minimal state variable
solution is robustly stable under learning provided the expectational feedback is
not both positive and large, while the nonfundamental solution is never robustly
stable. Overlapping generations and New Keynesian models are considered and
concerns raised in Cochrane (2011, 2017) are addressed.
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1 Introduction
We explore the connection between shock observability and equilibrium selection un-
der learning. Under rational expectations (RE) shock observability does not affect
equilibrium outcomes if current aggregates are observable, but stability under adap-
tive learning is altered. The common assumption that exogenous shocks are observ-
able to forward-looking agents has been questioned by prominent authors, including
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inspired by early conversations with Bennett McCallum and Pei Kuang. Financial support from
National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-1559209 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Cochrane (2009) and Levine et al. (2012). We examine the implications for equilib-
rium selection of taking the shocks as unobservable.
It is useful first to recall some standard terminology. An equilibrium, viewed here
as a stochastic process, is called “explosive” if it is unbounded (almost surely) as
time goes to infinity; otherwise it is called “non-explosive.” In Section 2 we also refer
to non-explosive solutions as “forward-stable” and we define “backward-stable” in
an analogous fashion. A linear model is said to be “determinate” if it has a unique
non-explosive equilibrium; it is called “indeterminate” if it has multiple non-explosive
equilibria; and it is called “explosive” otherwise.
With this terminology our results are easily summarized. Using a simple model,
we establish that determinacy implies the existence of a unique rational expectations
equilibrium that is robustly stable under learning. Our results also cover the inde-
terminate case. We then examine the concerns raised in Cochrane (2009, 2011, 2017)
about the New Keynesian model. These concerns arise in large part by his adoption
of RE as a modeling primitive. We view RE as more naturally arising as an emergent
outcome of an adaptive learning process, and we find that by modeling agents as
adaptive learners Cochrane’s concerns vanish.
To elaborate more fully, the presence of multiple equilibria in rational expecta-
tions models has resulted in frequent debates on selection criteria. In the determinate
case it is common practice to pick the unique non-explosive RE solution. This choice
has theoretical support when the explosive paths can be shown not to be legiti-
mate equilibrium paths based on transversality conditions or on no-Ponzi-game or
other constraints. However, there are cases in which explosive RE paths meet all
the relevant equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, there are many models that are
indeterminate, i.e. have multiple non-explosive RE solutions.
Adaptive learning provides a natural equilibrium selection device. Under adap-
tive learning agents are assumed to form expectations using forecasting models, which
they update over time in response to observed data. There is a well-developed theory
that allows the researcher to assess whether agents, using least-squares updating of
the coefficients of their forecasting model, will come to behave in a manner that is
asymptotically consistent with RE, i.e. whether the rational expectations equilib-
rium (REE) is stable under learning: see Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).1 For the cases of equilibrium multiplicity studied in this paper
we adopt stability under adaptive learning as our selection criterion.
Both RE and the adaptive learning approach require precise specification of the
information structure. A common assumption is that agents are able to condition
time  forecasts on -dated exogenous shocks. While in some environments this as-
sumption may be quite natural, in others, e.g. for aggregate productivity or taste
1Using the standard linear three-equation reduced-form set-up, stability under adaptive learning
in New Keynesian models was first studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002).
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shocks, it may be difficult to defend. These issues have been raised recently in policy-
related literature: Cochrane (2009, 2011) has argued that the New Keynesian model’s
exogenous shocks, specifically the monetary policy shocks, are most naturally taken
as unobservable. RE models that exclude from information sets certain contempora-
neous variables have been prominent: Lucas (1973) did precisely this in his famous
islands model, and Mankiw and Reis (2002) have exploited the same idea in their
sticky information DSGE environment. A central part of this paper is to explore the
connection between observability and equilibrium selection.
In Section 2 we develop a general theory within the context of a simple forward-
looking model with an exogenous shock. We identify two REE of interest: the funda-
mental, or “minimal state variable” (MSV) solution, which is always non-explosive;
and a “non-fundamental” (NF) solution, which may or may not be non-explosive. We
then turn to stability under learning. In a model with observable shocks, McCallum
(2009a) showed that determinacy implies that only the MSV solution is stable under
learning. However, Cochrane (2009, 2011) argued that McCallum’s stability results
hinged on observability of these shocks. We study stability under learning of the two
solutions, taking into account the possibility of unobserved exogenous shocks. The
central result of our paper is that, regardless of the observability assumption, the
MSV solution is robustly stable under learning, provided only that the positive feed-
back from expectations is not too large. In contrast the NF solution is never robustly
stable under learning.
While our analysis is done in a general framework, the motivation for this study is
the collective issues raised by Cochrane (2009, 2011, 2017) in connection with the NK
model. To address these issues, Section 3 studies three applications. The first is the
flexible-price NKmodel employed by McCallum (2009a) and Cochrane (2009) in their
interchange.2 We find that provided the interest-rate rule satisfies the Taylor principle
the MSV solution is both the unique non-explosive solution and the unique robustly
stable REE under learning, regardless of shock observability. In particular, in the NK
model adaptive learning selects the REE solution typically adopted by practitioners.
The second application is a discrete-time version of the sticky-price NK model used
by Cochrane (2017) to study the backward-stable solution under an interest-rate peg.
We demonstrate that this solution is precisely the MSV solution and that it is not
stable under learning. The last application is an overlapping generations model with
production and money. This model can be either determinate (in which case the
MSV solution is the unique non-explosive solution) or indeterminate (in which case
the NF solution is also non-explosive). We show that in either case the MSV solution
is robustly stable under learning and the NF solution is not.
2McCallum (2012) provides detailed comments on this interchange and discusses further the issue
of equilibrium selection.
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2 Model and Results
Our key results can be presented most effectively in a linear univariate framework.
The model is given by
 = +1 +  and  = −1 +  where 0    1. (1)
Here  captures a positively autocorrelated stationary exogenous process, with  zero
mean,  and having bounded support. The parameter  measures the expectational
feedback in the model. We exclude the non-generic cases in which || = 1 or  = 1.
The expectational feedback parameter  plays an important role in the assessment of
equilibrium multiplicity. For convenience we do not include an intercept in (1); thus
 should be interpreted as in deviation from mean form.3 We assume throughout that
 is in the information set at time . Under adaptive learning it can matter whether
or not  is assumed to be observable by agents at time ; under RE, even if  is
assumed unobservable, agents can deduce at time  its value.
An REE is a stochastic process  that satisfies (1). As noted in the introduction
a standard selection criterion is that an equilibrium be non-explosive, i.e. “forward
stable” in the sense that it remains bounded as  → ∞. Also, we noted there that
when the model is determinate there is a unique forward-stable solution, and when the
model is indeterminate there are many such solutions. We examine both determinate
and indeterminate specifications of our models.
In our investigations, we consider two types of equilibria that are of central focus in
the literature: the minimal state variable solution and a non-fundamental or “bubble”
solution. These solutions are given by
MSV:  = (1− )−1 (2)
NF:  = 
−1−1 − 1

 (3)
Economists frequently adopt the MSV solution as the equilibrium of interest, in part
because it is generically forward stable, and in particular is the unique forward-stable
solution when the model is determinate, i.e. when ||  1. When the model is
indeterminate, i.e. ||  1, the NF solution is also forward stable.4
We use adaptive learning to select between these equilibria. The representative
agent is assumed to use a forecasting model, usually referred to as a perceived law
of motion, or PLM, to form expectations. The PLM depends on parameters that are
estimated and updated over time as new data become available. An REE is stable
3The omission of an intercept is without loss of generality because we include a constant in the
agent’s forecasting model to ensure robustness in learning the steady state.
4While there are many non-fundamental solutions, (3) is uniquely identified as having a finite
AR-representation.
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under learning if the parameter estimates converge to values that deliver RE forecasts.
As we will see the analysis of stability depends on whether  is observable.
2.1 Observable shocks
In this section we assume that  is observable to learning agents. To assess stability
of the MSV and NF solutions, we employ the E-stability principle. In each case we
provide agents with a PLM consistent the solution under consideration:
MSV PLM:  = + , or NF PLM:  = + −1 + 
Let  denote the PLM parameters, i.e.  = ( ) or  = (  ). The data generating
process implied by the PLM specifies a map  () taking PLM parameters to their
actual law of motion (ALM) counterparts. A fixed point ∗ of this  -map corresponds
to an REE. If the differential equation ̇ =  ()− is Lyapunov stable at ∗ the REE
is said to be E-stable. The E-stability principle states that E-stable REE are stable
under least-squares and closely related updating rules.
The REE parameters for the MSV and NF solutions are ∗ = (0 (1 − )−1)
and ∗ = (0 −1−()−1), respectively. Because we have assumed  is in devia-
tion from mean form, learning  = 0 corresponds to agents correctly learning the
steady state. The MSV PLM implies that ̂+1 =  + , where ̂+1 denotes
the conditional expectation of learning agents based on  and . The corresponding
T-map is  ( ) = ( 1 + )  and it is easily verified that ∗ = (0 (1 − )−1)
is E-stable and hence stable under least-squares learning if   1. The NF so-
lution PLM parameters (  ) = (0 −1−()−1) correspond to an REE. How-
ever, observability of  and the fact that ̂+1 =  +  +  imply the T-map
 (  ) = (1− )−1 ( 0 1 + ) for  6= −1 It follows that the NF solution
corresponds to a singularity in the T-map at  = −1. As is well known,5 this sin-
gularity implies the NF solution cannot be E-stable: for ( ) near (0−()−1) and
  −1 close to −1, the belief parameter  converges to zero and if   1 then
 = (  ) converges to the MSV solution under ̇ =  () − . The following
Theorem, known to the literature, summarizes these results:
Theorem 1 If the exogenous shocks are observable in the model (1) then (i) the MSV
solution is stable under learning when   1 and not stable under learning if   1,
and (ii) the NF solution is not stable under learning.
In fact, the MSV solution is robustly E-stable in the sense that it is locally stable
even when the PLM is overparameterized by including any finite number of lags of
5See Evans (1989), Evans and McGough (2005a) and McCallum (2009a).
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.
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For an application in Section 3 it will be useful to generalize this theorem to the
multivariate case. Specifically we consider model
 = +1 +  and  = Γ−1 +  (4)
with  ∈ R and  ∈ R. Here  is zero mean,  and having bounded support. We
assume that the roots of Γ are in (0 1) and that  is invertible. The corresponding
MSV solution is
 = , where vec () = ( − Γ0 ⊗ )−1 vec () 
and the NF solution is
 = 
−1−1 − −1Γ−1
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 10 If the exogenous shocks are observable in the model (4) then (i) the
MSV solution is stable under learning when the real parts of the eigenvalues of 
are less than one, and not stable under learning if any eigenvalue of  has real part
greater than one. (ii) The NF solution is not stable under learning.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Some observations are warranted. First, since the model is purely forward-looking,
invertibility of  is not restrictive in the sense that by a change of variables the model
can be reduced to a lower-dimensional system with an associated invertible matrix.
Second, in this multivariate case there are nonfundamental solutions in which the
coefficient on −1 is not 
−1. These solutions are also unstable under learning but
establishing this result requires additional analysis. Finally, while the instability of
the analog to NF solutions continues to hold in univariate models with predetermined
variables, in a multivariate setting these solutions may be stable under learning for
certain parameterizations: see Evans and McGough (2005b) and McGough, B., Meng,
Q. and Xue, J. (2013).
2.2 Unobservable shocks
We now assume that  is not observable to learning agents. To determine the appro-
priate PLMs we rewrite the MSV and NF solutions in terms of lags of :
MSV:  = −1 + (1− )−1  (5)
NF:  =
¡
−1 + 
¢
−1 − −1−2 − 1

 (6)
6If the model is indeterminate there are many forward-stable “sunspot” solutions. If   1 these
solutions are not stable under learning; if   −1 then there exist PLMs that impart stability under
learning to these solutions. See, for example, Evans and McGough (2011).
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We consider PLMs allowing for a finite number of lags of :
 = +
X
=1
− +  (7)
where  represents the agents’ perceived error term, assumed to be a zero mean 
stochastic process independent of lagged . Notice that agents’ beliefs are summarized
by the vector  = ( ), where  = (1     ).
Given their beliefs, agents form expectations as ̂+1 =  +
P
=1 +1−
Again, agents are assumed to use  to forecast +1. Joining these forecasts to the
model (1) leads to the ALM as before. Using  = −1 +  and letting (1) =
(1− 1)−1, we have the ALM
 = (1)(1− ) + −1 + (1) for  = 1
 = (1)(1− ) + (+ (1)2)−1 − ((1)2) −2 + (1) for  = 2
 = (1)(1− ) + (+ (1)2)−1 + (1)
−1X
=2
(+1 − )−
− ((1)) − + (1) for  ≥ 3
The functional forms of the forecasting model and the data generating process exhibit
the same linear dependency. This allows us to identify the  -map as usual, which
we label as  to track the number of lags of  in the PLM. The corresponding
E-stability differential equation is
̇ =  ()−   (8)
Set  = (0 ) and  = (0 −1+−−1) corresponding to equations (5)
and (6). Define
 = (
  0     0| {z }
−1 terms
) for  ≥ 1 and  = (  0     0| {z }
−2 terms
) for  ≥ 2
Note that 1 = 
 and 2 = 
 . The following result characterizes the
fixed points of  .
Lemma 1 The unique fixed point of 1 is 
  For  ≥ 2 the fixed points of 
are given by  and 

 
The proof of this and all results are in the Appendix. This Lemma shows that there
are precisely two equilibrium processes  consistent with forecasting models of the
form (7), and that they correspond to the MSV and NF solutions.
It is not a priori obvious how many lags agents should include in their forecasting
model. To account for this we adopt the following definition of robust stability:
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Definition 1 The MSV solution is robustly stable under learning provided  is
a Lyapunov-stable rest point of (8) for all  ≥ 1. The NF solution is robustly stable
under learning provided  is a Lyapunov-stable rest point of (8) for all  ≥ 2.
A robustly stable REE continues to be stable under learning when the PLM includes
more lags of  than the minimum needed. We have
Theorem 2 If the exogenous shocks are not observable in the model (1) then (i) the
MSV solution is robustly stable under learning when   1 and not robustly stable
under learning if   1, and (ii) the NF solution is not robustly stable under learning.
This shows how the stability results in the observable case extend to the unobservable
case.7 Further, we note that the instability result for the NF solution is even stronger
than stated in the theorem: the NF solution fails to be E-stable for each  ≥ 3
We remark that when   1 the MSV solution is robustly stable under learning
regardless of whether the model is determinate or indeterminate. Conversely, when
  1 the MSV (backward-stable) solution is not robustly stable under learning —
we return to this case in an example below. The NF solution is stationary when
||  1 and explosive when ||  1; however, in both cases the NF solution fails to
be robustly stable under learning.
2.3 Discussion: the backward-stable solution
As suggested above, when the model is determinate, forward stability is often adopted
as a equilibrium selection criterion. This adoption reflects that forward-stable equi-
libria typically satisfy certain agent-level optimality conditions and other feasibility
constraints. On the other hand, as pointed out by a number of authors, including
Cochrane (2009), equilibria that are not bounded as  → ∞ need not necessarily
violate these conditions and constraints, particularly if the unbounded variables are
nominal. Nonetheless requiring forward stability remains a widely adopted selection
criterion, and indeed Cochrane (2017) extends this notion to apply in the indetermi-
nate case by including the requirement that a solution also be “backwards stable,”
i.e. that the equilibrium remains bounded as → −∞.
Here we construct the backward-stable solution in a simple indeterminate model,
and we start with the nonstochastic version:  = +1 with ||  1. The collection
of perfect foresight solutions takes the form  = 
−, for any  ∈ R. Observe that
7The proof of Theorem 2 is somewhat technical, requiring center-manifold reduction and bifur-
cations analysis, which makes extensions non-trivial; however, we anticipate that this result holds
in the multivariate case. When predetermined variables are introduced, a new equilibrium concept
is required, which further complicates matters.
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if  6= 0 then ||→∞ as →−∞. In this sense a backward-stable solution requires
 = 0. This REE corresponds to the MSV solution  = 0.
The concept can easily accommodate the stochastic version of our model (1).
Continuing to set  = 0, backward iteration provides that
 = −
X
≥1
−− +
X
≥0
−−, (9)
where  is an arbitrary martingale difference sequence (mds) capturing rational
forecast errors. If the process  is  then , as defined by equation (9) is sta-
tionary, and thus in a natural sense is both backward and forward stable. Letting
 = (1− )−1 , the solution (9) reduces to  = (1− )−1 , i.e. to the MSV
solution (2). Because the MSV solution is the “minimal” backward-stable solution,
and in particular does not depend on extraneous exogenous variables, it can be viewed
as the natural extension of the backward-stable solution to the stochastic case.
3 Applications
We consider three applications: a flexible-price version of the benchmark New Keyne-
sian model; the standard New Keynesian model; and a simple overlapping generations
model.
3.1 A flexible-price endowment economy
We first consider the flexible-price environment in which Cochrane andMcCallum pur-
sued their debate on whether the NK model uniquely identifies an equilibrium. The
general environment is an endowment economy with competitive markets for money,
goods, and one-period risk-free claims, flexible prices and infinitely-lived agents. The
representative household aims to maximize discounted expected utility with discount
factor 0    1. Expectations are formed against subjective beliefs, and the utility
is given by (−1) = (1− )−1
¡
1− − 1
¢
+ log
¡
−1
−1

¢
 with   0. Here 
is consumption,  = −1 is the inflation factor, and −1 = −1−1, where
−1 is nominal money holdings at the end of time  − 1. The budget constraint is
++ = −1
−1
 +−1
−1
 −1+E+T−1  where E is the household’s time  real
endowment of the perishable consumption good, −1 is the nominal interest rate fac-
tor,  is the household’s real bond holdings in , and T is nominal monetary injections
(which may be positive or negative). For simplicity we assume E = 1. The house-
hold’s first-order conditions are − = ̂
¡
−1+1
−
+1
¢
and  =  ( − 1)−1 .
Finally, we assume households cannot run Ponzi schemes.
There is no public spending and the government does not issue debt; it only
prints money and provides nominal injections (transfers). It follows that  = 0. The
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government’s real flow constraint is given by  = 

−1+T, which in nominal
terms is simply  −−1 = T Through transfers, the government can choose the
nominal money supply  so that the nominal interest rate satisfies a Taylor rule
 = 1+() where () = (
∗−1) (∗)∗(∗−1)  Here  captures a serially
correlated policy shock, and is taken to be a stationary AR(1) process in logs, with
unit mean. Finally, the inflation target ∗ and the interest rate target ∗ are assumed
to satisfy ∗ = ∗. The model is closed by imposing market clearing.
There are alternative approaches to decision-making under adaptive learning. We
adopt the Euler-equation learning approach for its simplicity and because it aligns
with the one-step ahead framework, which was the focus of the debate between Mc-
Callum and Cochrane.8 We assume agents have homogeneous expectations. It follows
that all agents consume their endowment every period. Assuming that agents take
this into account when forecasting future consumption, the Euler equation implies
the temporary equilibrium9 (TE) consumption and money demands
 =
³
̂
¡
−1+1
¢´− 1
and  = 
³
( − 1) ̂
¡
−1+1
¢´−1
 (10)
Given , −1 and 

−1, temporary equilibrium values (   

 T) are
determined by  = 1,  = 

 

 = T +−1, the Taylor rule, and the identity
 = −1, where ̂
¡
−1+1
¢
is allowed to depend on current endogenous variables.
To see how the temporary equilibrium arises, it is helpful to consider a thought
experiment in which we start in equilibrium and consider a reduction in expected
inflation, or more precisely an increase in ̂
¡
−1+1
¢
. For simplicity suppose that
̂
¡
−1+1
¢
is predetermined, i.e. independent of current . The increase in the expec-
tations term ̂
¡
−1+1
¢
acts to reduce both goods demand and money demand, and
to raise the supply of saving. The fall in goods demand puts downward pressure on
prices  (and ), and the rise in the supply of savings corresponds to an increase in
bond demand, which, because bonds are in zero net supply, puts downward pressure
on interest rates.
In the temporary equilibrium the resulting fall in  increases consumption de-
mand, eliminating the excess supply of goods. The extent to which  and  fall is
determined by the Taylor rule, which is implemented by changes in  via transfer
payments.10 To summarize, an exogenous reduction in expected inflation leads to
8Other possible implementations of adaptive learning include the long-horizon approach of Pre-
ston (2005) and versions of the Adam and Marcet (2011) internal rationality approach. In both of
these approaches agents fully solve their dynamic program given beliefs. Our implementation can
be viewed as a bounded optimality approach, which is shown in Evans and McGough (2017) to be
asymptotically optimal. See also Evans and Honkapohja (2006).
9The temporary equilibrium concept was originally introduced by Hicks (1939).
10Real money balances increase in the temporary equilibrium. Nominal money supply increases
provided   
∗ − 1.
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lower inflation and interest rates in the temporary equilibrium. While our discussion
presumed that ̂
¡
−1+1
¢
is predetermined, this is not necessary. If ̂
¡
−1+1
¢
depends
on current  this introduces additional simultaneity into the temporary equilibrium
system, but the central intuition is unchanged and equilibrium is still well-defined.
To complete this example and bring to bear the analysis of Section 2, we follow
standard practice under RE and log-linearize the system around the non-stochastic
steady state ̄ = 1 and ∗ = ∗. Log-linearizing the consumption demand equation
(10) and the Taylor rule yield  = −−1
³
 − ̂+1
´
and  = +
¡
1− 
∗
¢

where all variables are now written as proportional deviations from means. Because
in equilibrium  = 0, these equations reduce to
 =
1

̂+1 +  (11)
where  is the stationary AR(1) process given by  = −−1(1−  (∗)−1).
Within a linearized framework equation (11) captures the key temporary equilib-
rium relationship. As usual, under RE this model is determinate provided the Taylor
principle   1 is satisfied; however, as Cochrane has emphasized, there remain mul-
tiple legitimate RE solutions. We use our results to select among the equilibria and
thereby connect to the interchange between Cochrane and McCallum. Specifically,
McCallum (2007) showed that determinacy implies E-stability of the MSV solution,
and McCallum (2009a) established that the NF solution is not E-stable. Cochrane
(2011) argues McCallum’s results hinge on the observability of exogenous shocks, and
that if they are taken as unobserved then the NF solution can be E-stable even when
the model is determinate. Theorem 2 dispels this notion, and extends McCallum’s
result to unobservable shocks. We conclude that stability under adaptive learning
does operate as a selection criterion in this model, and that it singles out the MSV
solution, i.e. the usual RE solution adopted by proponents of the NK model.
Cochrane (2009, 2011) raises a number of additional concerns about the NKmodel
in the determinate case that can be addressed using the agent-level development
above. First, Cochrane has suggested that there is no mechanism in the NK model
that pins down prices. Specifically Cochrane (2011, p. 580) writes: “There is no
corresponding mechanism to push inflation to the new-Keynesian value [given by the
MSV solution]... [S]upply equals demand and consumer optimization hold for any of
the alternative paths ... ”. He bases this position in part on his assertion (p. 582)
that “[t]he equations of the [NK] model do not specify a causal ordering. They are
just equilibrium conditions.”
Within the perfect-foresight environment, his argument has merit. However, the
absence of causality noted by Cochrane results from adopting RE as a primitive rather
than viewing it as an emergent outcome of an agent-level learning process.11 Under
11Interpreting REE as an emergent outcome is in line with the evolutionary view discussed in
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adaptive learning the causal ordering is as follows. At each point in time agents
form expectations of key economic variables based on an estimated forecasting model
and on observed data; they then form supply and demand schedules based on these
expectations and other agent-level variables like wealth. Market clearing gives the
temporary equilibrium prices and quantities. In the next period agents revise the
coefficients of their forecasting model, e.g. using least-squares updating, and the
process continues. This fully specifies a recursive system that defines an equilibrium
path under learning. In particular, under adaptive learning, a forecasting model is
precisely specified, and given this forecasting model a unique equilibrium path is
pinned down. In this way, the adaptive learning approach can resolve the multiplicity
problem inherent in the RE version of the model.
Cochrane also suggests that adopting the MSV solution in the NK paradigm
requires that the government be interpreted as threatening to “blow up” the economy
if that solution is not selected. Cochrane (2011, Appendix B, p. 3) asks: “Is inflation
really determined at a given value because for any other value the Fed threatens to
take us to a valid but “unlearnable” equilibrium?” The answer is no: inflation is
determined in temporary equilibrium, based on expectations that are revised over
time in response to observed data. Threats by the Fed are neither made nor needed.
A final issue raised by Cochrane (2009, p. 1111 and 2011, Appendix B, p. 2)
concerns econometric identification. Specifically, he correctly points out that in the
MSV solution the Taylor-rule parameter  is not econometrically identified. He
suggests this undermines the adaptive learning approach. However, as also pointed
out in McCallum (2012), this misunderstands adaptive learning by private agents as
requiring knowledge of the structural parameters. Under adaptive learning agents
need to forecast in order to make decisions, but they do not need to know or estimate
structural parameters in order to forecast. Instead they make forecasts the same way
that time-series econometricians typically do: by estimating least-squares projections
of the variables being forecasted on the relevant observables.
Furthermore, the identification issue raised by Cochrane is in any case largely
mitigated in models with learning, as shown in Chevillon, Massmann and Mavroeidis
(2010) and Christopeit and Massmann (2017). These authors distinguish between the
internal forecasting problem and the external estimation problem. Adaptive learning
concerns the former problem, and, as we noted above, identification of structural
parameters is irrelevant in our setting for agents making forecasts based on observed
data. The latter problem is that of an outside econometrician making inferences about
structural parameters given the data. If the data is assumed generated in the MSV
REE, then  is not identified; however, if the data is assumed generated by learning
agents, then, strikingly,  is identified. These authors demonstrate consistency and
provide the (possibly) nonstandard asymptotic distribution.
Sargent (2008).
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3.2 A sticky-price NK model
We turn to stability under learning of the backward-stable REE in a discrete-time
version of the standard NK model considered in Cochrane (2017). The model is
 = +1 − −1( −+1) and  = +1 +  +  or (12)
 = +1 +
1 +
2 where  = ( )
0
with appropriate 1 2, where it is straightforward to show that the eigenvalues
of  satisfy 1  1  2  0. Here  is , zero mean. In Appendix B we show that
the REE associated to a given deterministic interest-rate policy sequence {} may
be written as
( )
0
=  ·
ÃX
≥0
2−1− 
X
≥0
−1 +1+  
!0
≡  ·  (13)
which is the discrete-time analog of the backward-stable solution of Cochrane (2017).
Under an interest-rate peg, i.e. if  = 0 for all , Theorem 1
0 implies that the
REE (13) is not stable under learning.12 A non-zero interest-rate path introduces
a non-homogeneous component to the solution; and, to handle this, and to pro-
vide the greatest chance of stability under learning, we assume that agents observe
 in time  and know ; their only uncertainty involves the constant term. Thus
agents use the PLM  =  +  from which it follows that the ALM is given
by  =  + . The  -map is thus  () =  and the E-stability differential
equation is ̇ = ( − ). Because  has a real eigenvalue 1  1, the REE  = 0
is not E-stable.
5 10 15 20
-1
1
2
5 10 15 20
-1
1
2
Figure 1: Forward instability of backward-stable solutions
12This assumes our model (12) fully specifies the economy. The presence of active fiscal policy,
and the associated debt dynamics, introduces predetermined variables that may alter determinacy
and stability results. This is the subject of current research.
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We illustrate the instability using a real-time simulation. To estimate , agents
regress  −  on a constant. A recursive form of this estimator can be written as
 = −1 +  ( −  −−1) 
where  is the estimate of  using data up to time . Here  is the “gain” sequence,
which measures the responsiveness of the estimator to new data. Under “decreasing
gain” learning with  = 
−1 this corresponds to the usual least-squares estimator, in
which all data are given equal weight, whereas setting 1   =   0 discounts past
data and is referred to as “constant-gain” learning.
We apply this learning algorithm to a central policy experiment studied in Cochrane
(2017). Setting the shocks  to zero, we assume that, starting at time zero, the in-
terest rises from zero to 2% for 5 periods, before returning to zero. Figure 1 provides
both the REE and learning time paths using a gain of  = 01. This simulation sets
initial  = (−01−01) very close to zero, forcefully illustrating the instability of this
solution.
We note that Garcia Schmidt and Woodford (2015) take a different line to show-
ing the practical irrelevance of the backward-stable solution. Their analysis uses a
“reflective” approach, which is predicated on knowledge by agents of the economic
structure and a reasoning process akin to the eductive analysis advocated in Gues-
nerie (1992). While we regard our analysis and theirs as complementary, we emphasize
that our boundedly rational approach does not require that our agents have structural
knowledge of the economy.
3.3 Equilibrium selection in the OLG model
In this section, we develop a simple overlapping generations model with productivity
shocks as the exogenous stochastic driver. There is a continuum of agents born at
each time  indexed by  ∈ Ω. Each agent lives two periods, works when young
and consumes when old. The population is constant at unit mass. Each agent owns
a production technology that is linear in labor and produces a common, perishable
consumption good. The technology is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The agent can sell his produced good in a competitive market for a quantity of fiat
currency, anticipating that he will be able to use this currency when old to purchase
goods for consumption.
Let  ∈ Ω be the index of a representative agent born in time . This agent’s
problem is given by
max ̂() ((+1())− (()) (14)
subject to ()() = () and +1() = +1(). Here, () is the
agent’s labor supply when young, () is a positive productivity shock, and ()()
is his output. Also,  is the time  goods price of money and +1() is the agent’s
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planned consumption when old. The expectations operator ̂() (·) denotes the ex-
pectation of agent  at time , taken with respect to his subjective beliefs conditional
on the information available to him. This information includes (), (), ()
and current and lagged values of 
Assuming CRRA utility with risk aversion , and that  0 = 1, we obtain agent
’s decision rules:
() =
Ãµ
()

¶1−
̂()
¡
1−+1
¢! 1
and () =
µ
()

̂()
¡
1−+1
¢¶ 1

We note that the quantity of money demanded by agent  at time , depends on,
among other things, the price at time . Assuming a constant (unit) supply of money,
the market-clearing condition
R
Ω
() = 1 yields
 =
µZ
Ω
³
()̂()
¡
1−+1
¢´ 1

¶
 (15)
which characterizes the equilibrium price path.
To address the observability issue we assume that the productivity shocks ()
have a common unobserved aggregate component , which in log form is taken to be
a stationary AR(1) process and white-noise idiosyncratic components that are inde-
pendent across agents. Assuming that all agents have the same forecast of aggregates,
Appendix C shows that to first order, equation (15) simplifies to
log  = (1− )̂ log +1 + log 
This reduces to our model (1) with  = log  and  = log  This model is inde-
terminate and has both MSV and NF solutions as stationary equilibria when   2.
Theorem 2 shows that the MSV solution, but not the NF solution, is robustly stable
under learning. When  ∈ (0 2) the model is determinate. The MSV solution is
stationary and robustly stable. The NF solutions diverge away from the steady state
and converges either to infinity or zero almost surely. Whether the explosive path
represents a genuine equilibrium depends on model details, but in any case the NF
solution is not robustly stable.13
4 Conclusion
We use adaptive learning to address equilibrium selection, taking into account issues
of observability. The key results in our set-up are that provided there is not positive
13In a related nonstochastic endowment economy Lucas (1986) showed that the path to autarky
(corresponding here to  → 0) was not stable under a simple learning rule.
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expectational feedback that is too large, MSV solutions are robustly stable under
learning, while nonfundamental solutions are not robustly stable under learning under
any circumstances. In NK models these results indicate the desirability of the Taylor
principle, and the dangers of an interest-rate peg, and that when the Taylor principle
is followed, the standard solution to the NK model is the appropriate choice.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Results
Proof of Theorem 10. Part (i) follows from Proposition 10.3, p. 238 of Evans and
Honkapohja (2001). To establish part (ii), note that the T-map takes the form
 (  ) =
¡
( − )−1  0 ( − )−1 ( + Γ)¢ 
when  6= −1. Under the E-stability dynamics we have in particular that ̇ = −.
If  (0) = (1− )−1 for   0 small, then the E-stability dynamics are well-defined
and imply that → 0. It follows that  = −1 is not locally E-stable.
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that with (1) = (1− 1)−1 the map 1 is given by
→ ((1− )(1))  and 1 → , and the map 2 is given by → ((1− )(1)) ,
1 → + (1)2 and 2 →− ((1)2). For  ≥ 3, the map  is given by
 → ((1− )(1))  (16)
1 → + (1)2 (17)
 → (1)(+1 − ) for  = 2      − 1 (18)
 → − ((1))  (19)
Direct computation shows that  is the unique fixed point of 1 and that 


is a fixed point of  for  ≥ 2. It is similarly straightforward to verify that  is
a fixed point of  for  ≥ 2.
Now let ∗ = (∗ ∗) be any fixed point of  for  ≥ 2, and assume ∗ 6=  
Notice that if ∗2 = 0 then 
∗
1 6= 0. It follows that there is a smallest ̃ ∈ {1     }
so that ∗̃ 6= 0. Further, ̃ ≥ 2: indeed ̃ = 1 implies ∗ =  
We claim that −(∗1) = 1. Indeed, if ̃ =  the we are done by (19). If ̃  
then, since ̃ ≥ 2 and since ∗̃+1 = 0, the claim follows by (18). We conclude that
∗1 = 
−1 + . Then by (17), ∗2 = ((
∗
1))
−1
(∗1 − ) = − Finally, if  ≥ 3 we
may recursively compute, for  ≥ 3, that ∗ =
¡
((∗1))
−1
+ 
¢
∗−1 = 0 It follows
that ∗ =  , completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. We need to assess E-stability of the MSV and NF solutions
for each  using (8) by obtaining the derivative matrix of  evaluated at 


and at  . Let 

 denote the map (16) and 

 denote the map given by (17)-(19).
Because the T-map decouples, E-stability can be analyzed by focusing on 

  and




 , separately.
We first consider  . Evaluated at this fixed point, we have 

 =
(1− )−1 (1− ) Also,  1 1 = 0 and, for  ≥ 2,µ

0



¶
 
=
⎧⎨⎩ (− 1)
−1
 if  =   1
(1− )−1  if  =  − 1
0 else

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which yields eigenvalues of 0 and (− 1)−1 . For E-stability we need (− 1)−1  
1 and (1− )−1 (1− )  1. Since 0    1 it is straightforward to verify that
E-stability holds if and only if   1. This completes the proof of Part 1.
Turning to  , we have 

 = −−1(1 − ) which satisfies    1
since 0    1. We next compute
µ

0


 − 
¶
 
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
−()−1 − 1 if  =  = 1
−1 if  =  + 1 = 2
−−1 if  =  − 1
0 else
 (20)
where  is the  × identity matrix. The eigenvalues of (20) are −1 and −()−1,
plus a zero eigenvalue with multiplicity  − 2. E-stability requires that they be less
than or equal to zero. It follows that if   0 then  is not E-stable for any  ≥ 2,
and again the result follows. We thus now assume that   0.
Returning to the case  = 2, we conclude that with   0 the fixed point 2
is E-stable. If instead   2 then the presence of zero eigenvalues implies that
the dynamic system (8) is non-hyperbolic at the fixed point  , and higher-order
stability analysis is required.
To assess the stability  for  ≥ 3, we first study the case  = 3; the
remaining cases will be addressed by induction. For notional simplicity, let ∗ be
the lag coefficients 3 . We begin by changing coordinates:  =  − ∗. Define
 : R3 → R3 by  () =  3 (+∗)−(+∗) Because  is obtained from  3 −3 by
an affine transform, the stability of ∗ as a fixed point of the system  =  3 ()−
is equivalent to the stability of the origin as a fixed point of  =  (). Thus we
study the latter system.
By Taylor’s theorem, we may write  () =  (0)+̂(), where ̂() ≡  ()−
 (0) is zero to first order. Diagonalize the derivative of  as  (0) = Λ−1,
where Λ = −1⊕−()−1 ⊕ 0. Change coordinates:  = −1. It follows that
 = −1 () = −1 (0)+ −1̂() = Λ + −1̂() or
 ≡ Λ +() (21)
where the last equality defines notation. The stability of the origin as a fixed point
of  =  () is equivalent to the stability of the origin as a fixed point of (21).
The system (21) has two stable eigenvalues and one zero eigenvalue. By the center-
manifold theorem the origin in R3 is a Lyapunov-stable steady state of (21) if and
only if the origin in R is an Lyapunov-stable steady state of
3 = 
3 (1(3) 2(3) 3)  (22)
where a superscript indicates the coordinate in the range, i.e.  = (123)0,
and where functions  are zero to first order: (0) = 
0
(0) = 0 for  = 1 2.
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We are required now to determine the explicit form of3. Since the last row of −1
is (0 0 1) we have that 3 = 
3() =  3(). Since the last row of Λ is (0 0 0)
by equation (21) we have that 3 = 3(). It follows that 3() =  3(). We
compute the third coordinate of  as
 3() = = − (1− (1 + ∗1))−1 3 − 3 = −(1 + )−113
where the second equality uses ∗1 = 
−1 + . Continuing, we compute
3() =
¡
(3 − 1)− 2 + 2
¢−1
3(2 − (3 − 1)) (23)
We conclude that
3 =
¡
(3 − 1(3))− 2(3) + 2
¢−1
3(2(3)− (3 − 1(3))) ≡ (3)
where the second equality defines notation.
Writing (3) = 
3 (1(3) 2(3) 3) we have 
0 = 31
0
1 +
3
2
0
2 +
3
3 and
00 = (311
0
1 +
3
12
0
2 +
3
13)
0
1 +
3
1
00
1 + (
3
21
0
1 +
3
22
0
2 +
3
23)
0
1 +
3
2
00
2
+ 331
0
1 +
3
32
0
2 +
3
33
where the arguments have been suppressed to ease notation, and, for example, 3 =
23. Using (23) it is immediate the 
3
 = 0 for  = 1 2 3. Since  = 
0
 = 0
for  = 1 2, it follows, then, that 0 = 0 and 00 = 333. Again using (23), we compute
directly that 00 = −2−2.
The above computations allow us to use Taylor’s theorem to write 3 =
−−223 + O(|3|3) It follows that the origin is not a Lyapunov stable fixed point
of (22): there exists    0 so that if the system (22) is initialized in the interval
(− 0) the corresponding trajectory will exit the interval (− ) in finite time. We
conclude that 3 is not a Lyapunov-stable fixed point of (8).
Having showing instability for  = 3, we now proceed by induction. Some more
notation is needed. Denote by ∆ the metric on R induced by the max-norm: kk =
max || Next, recalling the observation above that we may ignore the constant term
in the PLM, we denote by () ∈ R a beliefs parameter corresponding to a PLM
with no constant term and  lags, and let ∗() be the lag coefficients of the fixed
point  . Let () be the -ball with respect to the metric ∆, centered at 
∗().
Finally, let () be the beliefs time-path implied by () = 

(())−()
corresponding to the initial condition 0().
Assume instability for the  − 1 dimensional system. Let   0 be such that
for all 0    , there exists a point 0( − 1) ∈ −1() such that ( − 1)
eventually exits −1(). Now let 
0() = ((0( − 1)) 0) ∈ (). It suffices
to show that () eventually exits (). By looking back at the definition of
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the T-map, notice that () = (−(1())− 1)() Since the initial
condition has 0() = 0, this differential equation implies that 

() = 0 for all .
Now consider again the T-map, this time focusing on the implied dynamics of −1:
−1() = (1())(()− −1())− −1()
= (−(1())− 1)−1();
the second equality obtains from the fact that () = 0. But this is precisely
the differential equation determining the path −1( − 1). From the recursive
construction of the T-map, (17)-(18), it further follows that, for    − 1, the
differential equation determining the path of (−1) is functionally identical to the
differential equation governing the dynamics of (). We conclude that if 
0() =
(0( − 1) 0) then for  ≤  − 1, () = ( − 1). By the induction hypothesis,
there exists a  and an  ∈ {1      − 1} so that | ( − 1)|  ; since  () =
 ( − 1), the proof is complete.
Appendix B: Sticky-price NK Model
Recall that we write the model as  = +1+
1+
2 where  = ( )
0.
Factor as follows: −1 = (1 ⊕ 2)−1, where generically 1  1  2  0.
Changing coordinates to  = −1 gives
1 = 1 + 2 + 2I+1 and 2 = 2 + 1U−1 + 2I−1 +F 
Here  is an mds capturing the forecast errors associated with , and the remaining
terms are defined as follows:
I =
X
≥0
−1 +I =
X
≥0
2− U =
X
≥0
2− F =
X
≥0
2−
1 =
¡−−1−11¢
2
 2 =
¡−−1−12¢
2
 1 =
¡
−1−11
¢
1
 2 =
¡
−1−12
¢
1

Letting  = −12 yields 1U−1 +F = −
1
2
 Finally, letting
 =  ·
µ
1 2 0 0 −12
0 0 2 2 1
¶
the REE associated to a given policy {} and shock path {} may be written
( )
0
=  · ¡I−1 I+1  ¢0 ≡  · 
where here we have set  = 0. This equation corresponds to (13).
Appendix C: The OLG Model
Agent ’s productivity shock includes both an idiosyncratic and an aggregate
component, i.e.
log (()) = log () + log (()) and log () =  log (−1) + 
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where the log (()) are  mean zero and independent across agents,  is  zero
mean with small support and log (()) and  are independent processes. The
market-clearing condition
R
Ω
() = 1 yields
 = 
µZ
Ω
³
()̂()
¡
1−+1
¢´ 1

¶
 (24)
Equation (24) characterizes the equilibrium price path. Clearly () can be useful
for forecasting +1 only through its correlation with . Furthermore if the variance
of the idiosyncratic shock is large relative the variance of the aggregate shock then
the information content of () for forecasting +1 is small.
An REE is characterized by  = 
1−
+1  where 
1
 =
R
Ω
()
1
  However,
it is neither natural nor necessary to assume agents observe  when making rational
forecasts. The required information under RE is encoded in the current price level
. Thus under RE agent  has no reason to condition his forecast on (). We
assume this behavior extends outside of RE as well.
Assuming all agents hold the same forecast of (functions of) aggregates, i.e.
̂()(+1) = ̂(+1) for all  and well-behaved functions  , the unique, mone-
tary, non-stochastic steady state is given by  = 1. Provided that the expectations
operators of agents are reasonably well-behaved (e.g. are linear, respect first-order
approximations, fix constants, etc.), we may linearize (24) around this steady state,
and simplify to obtain log  = (1 − )̂ log +1 + log  since, by independence,R
Ω
log () = log .
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